TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/073090/0730009.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 8KB | 160 lines

                µE                                                          WORLD, Page 42

DIPLOMACY

Change of Course


The U.S. does an about-face on its Cambodia policy, paving the
way for talks with Vietnam

By JILL SMOLOWE -- Reported by J.F.O. McAllister with Baker and
William Stewart/Hong Kong


    As Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze disappeared behind closed doors
in Paris last week, the expectation was that they would work
out some new approach to the problem of Afghanistan. But when
Baker emerged two hours later, few were ready for the
announcement he made.

    Reversing a position that dates back to the Carter White
House, Baker said the U.S. would withdraw diplomatic
recognition of the Cambodian resistance coalition that includes
the Khmer Rouge and would open talks with Vietnam about a
Cambodian settlement. Officials in Washington and Moscow were
caught off guard; diplomats in Hanoi and Beijing were stunned;
and most Southeast Asian nations, with the exception of
Thailand and Vietnam, were dismayed.

    If the 180 degrees shift came as a shock, it should have
been no real surprise. U.S. support of the bloodstained Khmer
Rouge -- however grudging -- had long looked too contradictory
and too immoral to sustain. The Bush Administration's strategy
has three goals: securing the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces
from Cambodia, preventing the Khmer Rouge's return to power,
and holding free elections to seat a new government.

    Goal No. 1 was achieved last September when the last of
Vietnam's 200,000 combat troops returned home -- though some
have apparently returned to bolster the faltering Cambodian
army. As for Goal No. 2, it never made sense for Washington to
support a three-part coalition that included the Khmer Rouge
while decrying the possible return to power of Pol Pot's
forces. With last week's unequivocal shift away from the Khmer
Rouge, the U.S. Administration finally brought strategy and
policy into line on Goal No. 2, paving the way for movement on
Goal No. 3.

    The decision resulted primarily from the Administration's
belated recognition of battlefield realities in Cambodia and
political realities on Capitol Hill. Over the past six months,
the Khmer Rouge forces, an estimated 30,000 strong, have been
pursuing a rural-based strategy similar to the one that enabled
them to encircle and take the capital city of Phnom Penh in
1975. While the Khmer Rouge are stronger militarily than at any
other time since they were chased from power by Vietnam 11
years ago, some well-informed analysts do not believe the gains
made during this rainy season represent a dramatic shift of
strength on the ground. As yet, no town of significant size or
importance has fallen to the Khmer Rouge. Still, with fighting
raging through the countryside, the situation could change
swiftly.

    While the Khmer Rouge have been pressing the regime of Prime
Minister Hun Sen, Congress has been pressuring the White House.
Lawmakers have been growing increasingly alarmed at the
possibility of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge forces,
which were responsible for the death of at least 1 million
fellow Cambodians during their reign of terror from 1975 to
1978. Last month the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
voted against further covert aid to the tripartite coalition;
the corresponding House committee was expected to follow suit.
Two weeks ago, a bipartisan group of 11 Senators circulated a
letter asking the Administration to alter its policy.

    Congressional reaction to the policy reversal was largely
positive. "This will help make it clear to one and all, at home
and abroad, that the U.S. will have nothing to do with the
Khmer Rouge," said Representative Stephen Solarz, a New York
Democrat. It seems likely that the Senate will follow the lead
of the House and approve the Administration's request for $7
million in overt aid to the two non-Khmer Rouge factions of the
resistance, one headed by former Cambodian head of state Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, the other by former Prime Minister Son Sann.
Some officials are ready for direct negotiations with Hun Sen,
whom Washington has, until now, dismissed as a mere puppet of
Vietnam. Baker himself suggested to the President two weeks ago
that talks be opened with the Cambodian Prime Minister. In a
decision made in typical Bush fashion -- maximum secrecy, high
domestic political content -- Bush approved the move to
withdraw diplomatic support of the guerrilla coalition but
would go no further for now. That was still good news for those
officials at the State Department, led by Under Secretary for
Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, who have been arguing for
months that the U.S. should distance itself from the Khmer
Rouge. Explains an official familiar with Baker's thinking: "It
gets much harder, as the Khmer Rouge advance, for us to ignore
the relationship between our allies and the Khmer Rouge and,
by extension, between us and the Khmer Rouge."

    Only China now backs the Khmer Rouge. Last week Beijing
issued a stern rebuke to Washington for withdrawing support
from the resistance coalition and vowed to continue its
support. "So long as Vietnam has not withdrawn all its troops
from Cambodia genuinely," said Jin Guihua, a Foreign Ministry
spokesman, "China will continue to support the Cambodian people
in their struggle against foreign invaders." Beijing has not
softened its hostility toward Hun Sen, but there are subtle
signs that China may yet shift its position. Some officials now
mention that Hun Sen's grandfather was Chinese, seeming to hint
at the possibility of a new relationship.

    The decision to break with the Khmer Rouge eliminates a
political and diplomatic embarrassment for the Bush
Administration, but U.S. officials acknowledge that peace in
Cambodia is unlikely until the Chinese agree to cut off aid to
the Khmer Rouge. "As long as they get whatever they want from
China, they will see no reason to go from the battlefield to
elections," says a congressional staffer. "They aren't going
to throw in the towel just because they lost their seat in the
U.N." The noncommunist resistance also sounds determined to
carry on. From his residence in North Korea, Sihanouk branded
the U.S. decision "an act of very serious injustice" and vowed
to continue the fight.

    If Cambodia's future is still problematic, Vietnam's looks
more promising. Ever since the Vietnamese withdrew their troops
from Cambodia, they have been eagerly waiting for the U.S. to
restore diplomatic relations and end the trade embargo that
deepens their desperate economic problems. By agreeing to open
talks with Hanoi on the Cambodian issue, Baker has at least
opened the door to the possibility of normalizing relations
after 15 years of isolation.

    Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnam's Foreign Minister, hailed the U.S.
overture and expressed Hanoi's readiness to talk. "It is the
beginning of the thaw we have been waiting years for," said
Nguyen Xuan Oanh, a onetime South Vietnamese Vice Premier and
now a national Assemblyman and an economic adviser to the
government. "We are ready for anything."

    Last week Baker seemed to anticipate Hanoi's enthusiasm and,
wary of the political fallout in the U.S. from any cozying up
to Vietnam, applied a brake. "This change in policy does not
constitute a decision to normalize relations with Vietnam," he
cautioned. "We are just beginning a dialogue with Vietnam on
Cambodia." But he held out the promise that firm movement on
a Cambodian settlement leading to free elections, coupled with
greater cooperation in resolving questions about U.S. prisoners
of war and soldiers missing in action, might lead to full
diplomatic ties. After almost four decades of conflict in the
region and millions of deaths, such normality seems a goal
devoutly to be desired.